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ENSURING A FAIR HEARING FOR
LITIGANTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES:
THE LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
CAPACITY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS IN CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS
Kevin M. Cremin, Jean Philips, Claudia Sickinger, M.D., and
Jeanette Zelhof*
Q: Did you have any occasion before this to review
records or talk to psychiatrists or anybody else regarding
the mental health condition of Resident G?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you know if Resident G was just a big liar?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Well, did you check her records or talk to her
psychiatrist to see whether one of the problems with her
mental health is that she‘s a liar?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Resident E[,] does he have a mental health
diagnosis?
...
A: . . . He‘s schizophrenic.
* Kevin M. Cremin is a senior attorney at MFY Legal Services, Inc., and a
Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia Law School. Jean Philips is a former staff attorney
at MFY Legal Services, Inc. Dr. Claudia Sickinger is a psychiatrist and the
medical director of the Westchester ARC Clinic. Dr. Sickinger is a graduate of
Mt. Sinai Medical Center and a former fellow in public psychiatry at Columbia
University/New York State Psychiatric Institute. Jeanette Zelhof is the Deputy
Director of MFY Legal Services, Inc. The authors wish to thank Elise Brown for
her assistance with this article.
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...
Q: Did you ask Resident E for consent to be able to review
his mental health records?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Do you know how big a liar Resident E is?
. . .1

INTRODUCTION
The above quotation is from a proceeding against the operator
of an adult home in New York City that houses over 200
individuals with disabilities. In that proceeding, the New York
State Department of Health accused the operator of abusing and
exploiting the home‘s mentally ill residents.2 The quotation
provides an example of the types of difficulties and, in some cases,
outright injustices experienced by people with mental illnesses
(PWMI) when proceedings involving their interests are heard in
court or administrative hearings.
Featured is a line of questioning of a government witness by
the operator‘s attorney, who equated being mentally ill with being
a ―big liar.‖ Never during this line of questioning did attorneys for
the New York State Department of Health, which was purportedly
representing the interests of the residents, object.3 There were

1

Transcript of Hearing at 522–24, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, as
Comm‘r of Health of the State New York, to determine the action to be taken
with respect to Benito Fernandez, as Operator of Brooklyn Manor Home for
Adults (N.Y. Dep‘t of Health Jan. 23, 2006) (Unpublished Report and Decision)
(copy on file at MFY Legal Services, Inc.) [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing, In
the Matter of Antonia C. Novello]. In this proceeding, the Honorable James F.
Horan, an Administrative Law Judge, was charged with determining whether the
operating certificate of Benito Fernandez, operator of Brooklyn Manor Home
for Adults, should be revoked.
2
See id.
3
Although ―[t]he rules of evidence need not be observed‖ during an
administrative hearing involving the New York State Department of Health,
parties may make requests and submit exceptions, and the hearing officer has
the power to ―admit or exclude evidence.‖ See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 10, §§ 51.11(d)(2), 51.9(c)(1), (6) (2008).
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numerous potential objections to these questions because, at the
very least, they were argumentative, lacked a proper foundation,
and assumed facts that were not in evidence. The residents whose
complaints were the subject of the hearing were not able to defend
themselves from these attacks because both they and their
advocates from MFY Legal Services, Inc. (MFY), were barred
from attending the proceeding. Unfortunately, this type of
treatment of PWMI is commonplace in our legal system.
Most PWMI do not live in institutions.4 In fact, most reside in
the community and are active members of society. Like other
people, they are subject to being sued and can bring their own
lawsuits. When PWMI are in court, however, the stakes are often
quite high. Even in civil cases, judges may have the power to
grant, preserve, or deny government benefits that enable PWMI to
obtain basic necessities. Judges also may be empowered to make
decisions that could result in PWMI being evicted from their
homes. It is therefore essential to ensure that PWMI are able to
obtain fair hearings that are free from discrimination.
This Article arises from the work of MFY‘s Mental Health
Law Project and Adult Home Advocacy Project in courts of law
and administrative proceedings in New York City. MFY has
provided free civil legal services to low-income New Yorkers
since its founding in 1963. It was originally a unit of Mobilization
for Youth, a social welfare organization on Manhattan‘s Lower
East Side, but was incorporated as a separate not-for-profit law
firm in 1968. Since 1983, MFY‘s Mental Health Law Project has
provided advocacy services to PWMI, including consultation,
advice, and direct representation. Since 1992, MFY‘s Adult Home

4

According to the National Institute of Mental Health, ―[a]n estimated 26.2
percent of Americans ages 18 and older—about one in four adults—suffer from
a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.‖ National Institute of Mental
Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mentaldisorders-in-america.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2008). Institutionalization does,
however, still occur. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and
“Discreditable”: The Search for Political Identity by People with Psychiatric
Diagnoses, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1366 (2003) (noting that ―49 states
still have mental hospitals‖).
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Advocacy Project has focused on protecting the rights of mentally
ill residents of adult homes. 5 These projects represent PWMI in
matters related to housing, Supplemental Security Income and
Social Security Disability benefits, public assistance, Medicaid,
civil rights, and numerous other issues. MFY‘s representation
enables PWMI to avoid homelessness and to remain in the
community by ensuring the preservation of their incomes and
affordable housing. During 2008 alone, the organization advised or
represented more than 2,500 PWMI.
Given the volume and the nature of its caseload, MFY has a
unique perspective on the problems facing PWMI in civil and
administrative proceedings. Although there are other organizations
and governmental entities that represent PWMI, they generally do
so in cases where the client‘s disability is always central to the
legal issue at hand—such as involuntary commitment or social
security hearings. MFY, however, represents PWMI in a wide
range of cases, in many of which the client‘s disability is not
centrally or even peripherally relevant to his or her legal problem.
Yet, even in those matters, MFY often sees how a tribunal‘s
treatment of the client is skewed by the knowledge that he or she
has a mental health problem.
The purpose of this Article is to highlight the problems
encountered by PWMI giving testimony in civil and administrative
5

See generally http://www.mfy.org/adulthome.shtml. In New York, an
adult home is defined as a facility that is ―established and operated for the
purpose of providing long-term residential care, room, board, housekeeping,
personal care and supervision to five or more adults unrelated to the operator.‖
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 487.2(a) (2008). Adult homes are for
―adults who, though not requiring continual medical or nursing care . . . , are, by
reason of physical or other limitations associated with age, physical or mental
disabilities or other factors, unable or substantially unable to live independently.‖
Id. § 485.2(a). Outside of New York State, adult homes are generally known as
―board and care homes.‖ Medicare defines a ―board and care home‖ as ―group
living arrangement [that] provides help with activities of daily living such as
eating, bathing, and using the bathroom for people who cannot live on their own
but do not need nursing home services.‖ Medicare: Types of Long-Term Care,
http://www.medicare.gov/LongTermCare/Static/BoardCareHome.asp?dest=NA
V%7CTypes%7CTypes%7CBoardCareHome#TabTop (last visited Dec. 17,
2008).
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proceedings and to challenge court personnel and advocates to
rethink their approaches to matters involving PWMI in light of
modern clinical information and available research on the subject.
We also offer some suggestions on how to facilitate better
communication and obtain useful testimony in civil court
proceedings involving PWMI, which we hope will lead to more
equitable rulings.
Part I of this Article describes the way in which the legal
system determines the capacity and credibility of PWMI who are
involved in litigation. This part begins with a discussion of the
applicable law regarding the determination of capacity,
admissibility, and credibility. It then gives examples of how, in
practice, these legal standards are often ignored or misapplied due
to improper assumptions and prejudices about PWMI.
Part II presents modern clinical evidence regarding the capacity
and credibility of PWMI. In this part, we show that data available
from research studies support the notion that having a particular
mental health condition does not necessarily mean that an
individual lacks capacity to testify. Similarly, with regard to
credibility, the clinical evidence shows that it is not possible to
make generalizations regarding an individual‘s ability to provide
accurate information simply based on whether that individual has a
psychiatric diagnosis or a mental health history.
Part III of this Article sets forth a series of recommendations
that would improve the ability of the legal system to provide fair
hearings for PWMI. These recommendations include: training
court personnel, advocates, and guardians ad litem to improve their
understanding of mental illness and PWMI; enforcing legal and
evidentiary standards in light of modern clinical research findings;
and providing reasonable accommodations to improve the
accessibility of the court system for PWMI.
I. CAPACITY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
RELATED TO PWMI IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
MFY‘s experience representing PWMI in various forums is
that the testimony of PWMI is often excluded or disregarded.
Sometimes this is because legal standards that presume PWMI to
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have the capacity to testify are ignored or misapplied. Sometimes
the law is nominally applied, but courts make rulings based on
unwarranted and prejudicial inferences about mental illness.
Frequently, however, there is no legal analysis because courts or
advocates either assume without discussion that the testimony of
witnesses with mental illnesses is not valuable, or because they are
not willing to make accommodations necessary to enable this
testimony to be taken.
A. The Law Regarding Capacity, Admissibility, and Credibility
1. The Threshold Question: Capacity to Testify
Before reaching issues of admissibility and credibility, courts
may examine the threshold question of whether a witness with a
mental disability has the capacity to testify. The capacity of a
witness to testify is a question of law; in other words, in a jury
trial, the judge makes this decision. 6 In New York, as in federal
courts, there is a presumption of an adult witness‘s capacity to
testify. 7 There is also a general policy that favors allowing litigants
with mental disabilities to testify. 8
The question of whether an individual has the capacity to
testify in court is entirely distinct from the question of whether an
6

See FED. R. EVID. 601 (―Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in
accordance with State law.‖); People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (1978)
(―The capacity of a person to be a witness is presumed and, if objection is made
that he is incompetent, it is for the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, to
determine his mental capacity to testify.‖).
7
See FED. R. EVID. 601; Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d at 213.
8
See Tromello v. Dibuono, 132 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (―The
competency test above has been liberally construed in favor of the admission of
testimony by persons with limited mental capacity. Thus, for example, courts in
New York have determined in favor of admitting testimony by a nonverbal,
autistic and mentally retarded 11-year-old child, by a person judicially declared
incompetent and unable to manage his affairs, and mentally retarded adults with
the mental age of four- to six-year-olds.‖) (internal citations omitted).
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individual has capacity in any other aspect of his or her life. An
individual may have diminished capacity in one area while
retaining capacity in others. Almost one hundred years ago, the
New York State Court of Appeals ruled against appellants who
claimed that testimony given by the complaining witness should
not have been allowed on the ground that he had been judicially
declared ―incompetent to manage his own affairs‖ several years
earlier.9 In denying this ground for the appeal, the court noted:
It did not by any means follow from [the prior declaration
of incompetence] as a matter of law that he was, and for
years would continue to be, so utterly lacking in
intelligence that he could not appreciate at all the
relationship and significance of facts and would not be able
to understand the obligation of an oath and describe
accurately what those facts were.10
Since that time, statutory law on the capacity of PWMI has
evolved with society‘s understanding of the complexity of mental
illness. The New York Mental Hygiene Law, which allows courts
to appoint guardians for individuals proven to be incapable of
managing their own affairs, no longer provides for a simple
adjudication of ―competency‖ or ―incompetency.‖11 Instead, a
court must tailor a guardianship order to afford an incapacitated
individual the maximum amount of independence possible. A court
may grant a guardian powers only in the specific areas in which it
determines that the individual requires assistance.12 Thus, even if a
9

See Barker v. Washburn, 200 N.Y. 280, 283 (1911).
Id.
11
Competency was the standard under the former conservator and
committee statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Civil Practice Act 207 (2005); see also N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 77–78 (repealed 1992). Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene
Law, which replaced the conservator and committee statutes, no longer uses a
competency standard. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.43 (McKinney
2005).
12
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2005) (―The
legislature declares that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare
by establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy either
personal or property management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner
tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in account the
personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the
10
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guardian is appointed to apply for government benefits on a
person‘s behalf, the same person may retain her right to make
decisions about how to spend the government benefits. 13 Similarly,
pursuant to Article 81 of New York‘s Mental Hygiene Law, it is
possible for someone to be adjudicated incompetent to budget his
or her income, but competent to retain counsel and manage his or
her own medications. 14
For the same reason, when determining whether a witness has
the capacity to testify, it is inappropriate for a judge to make any
general assumptions. Instead, judges should ask two questions
when the capacity of a witness is challenged: (1) whether the
proposed witness is capable of comprehending the nature of an
oath, and (2) whether the witness is capable of giving an accurate
account of what he or she has seen and heard.15 The second
question carries greater weight, as the necessity of the oath itself
has been called into question during recent years. 16
This is true even in the context of criminal cases in New York.
Section 60.20 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states that
―[a]ny person may be a witness in a criminal proceeding unless the
court finds that, by reason of infancy or mental disease or defect,
he does not possess sufficient intelligence or capacity to justify the

person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and
participation in all the decisions affecting such person‘s life.‖).
13
See id. § 81.22(a)(7); see also id. § 81.29(a) (―An incapacitated person
for whom a guardian has been appointed retains all powers and rights except
those powers and rights which the guardian is granted.‖).
14
See id. § 81.02.
15
See, e.g., District of Columbia. v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 521–22 (1883);
People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (1964); Ellarson v. Ellarson, 190 N.Y.S.
6, 8 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 1921); see also FED. R. EVID. 603.
16
In Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183 (1975), the New York State Court of
Appeals reinstated an administrative decision that had been overturned on the
grounds that mentally retarded witnesses had not been administered an oath. At
the hearing, it had been determined that although the witnesses had capacity to
recount events, it would be senseless to administer an oath, because the
witnesses would not understand what it meant. See id. at 187. The court ruled
that where administration of an oath would not serve its purpose, witnesses
could testify unsworn, provided sufficient foundation existed supporting the
administrative law judge‘s determination of capacity. See id. at 190.
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reception of his evidence.‖17 Witnesses who are ―more than nine
years old‖ are generally required to testify under oath.18 A court
may make an exception, however, if it ―is satisfied that such
witness cannot, as a result of mental disease or defect, understand
the nature of an oath‖ but that ―the witness possesses sufficient
intelligence and capacity to justify the reception [of unsworn
evidence].‖19 The only caveat is that a defendant cannot be
convicted solely on the basis of such unsworn evidence.20
2. Admissibility and Exclusion of Evidence
Related to Mental Illness
When a witness with a mental disability testifies, the question
is raised whether evidence of his or her disability should be
admitted. The court makes the legal decision as to whether such
evidence should be admitted or excluded. 21 This aspect of the
process is essential because when evidence regarding the mental
health of a witness is readily admitted, the focus of the case
frequently shifts to mental health rather than the substantive legal
issues at stake.
The rules of evidence governing relevancy and admissibility in
New York state courts are generally consistent with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Evidence is relevant ―if it has any tendency in
reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.‖22 In general, ―all relevant
evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some

17

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.20(1) (2008).
Id. § 60.20(2).
19
Id.
20
Id. § 60.20(3).
21
See People v. Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978)
(citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.20).
22
People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777 (1988); see FED. R. EVID. 401
(―‗Relevant evidence‘ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖).
18
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exclusionary rule.‖23
The most commonly invoked exclusionary rule is that relevant
evidence ―may still be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of
its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or mislead
the jury.‖24 Given the stigma that is attached to mental illness, it is
likely that the danger of unfair prejudice would substantially
outweigh the probative value of a mental health history in any case
where that mental health history does not directly implicate the
subject matter of the case or the witness‘s veracity.
Furthermore, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
use of ―character evidence‖ is generally excluded. Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence states that ―[e]vidence of a person‘s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion‖
except under three enumerated circumstances. 25 The first two
circumstances pertain to criminal cases and involve the character
of the accused and the character of the alleged victim. 26 The third
circumstance applies to the character of witnesses in both civil and
criminal cases and allows, inter alia, character evidence to be used
to attack the credibility of a witness. 27 Similarly, ―the credibility of
a witness may be attacked . . . by evidence in the form of opinion
23

Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777; see FED. R. EVID. 402 (―All relevant evidence
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.‖).
24
Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777; see FED. R. EVID. 403 (―Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.‖).
25
FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see, e.g., Fanelli v. diLorenzo, 591 N.Y.S.2d 658,
659 (App. Div. 4th Dep‘t 1992) (holding that the trial court‘s admission of
―testimony that [the defendant] was typically non-violent and mellow when
intoxicated‖ constituted reversible error).
26
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(2).
27
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (referring to FED. R. EVID. 607, which states:
―The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling the witness.‖).
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or reputation, but . . . the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.‖28
Questions involving the admissibility of evidence of mental
illness arise frequently in criminal trials, when an individual with
mental illness is the complaining witness or the defendant. PWMI
are often in the position of being the complaining witnesses
because they are far more likely to be the victims of crime than
people who do not have mental health problems. 29
During criminal trials, evidence of mental illness is often
admitted under the exceptions to Rule 404‘s prohibition on the use
of ―character evidence.‖30 In cases where the sole or main witness
against a criminal defendant is discovered to have had a mental
illness that was not revealed to the jury, New York appellate courts
have overturned verdicts and ordered new trials. 31 Some courts,
however, specify that evidence of mental illness should be
admitted only if the mental condition in question may affect the
accuracy of the testimony. 32 This qualification is important
28

FED. R. EVID. 608(a); accord FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
Aaron Levin, People With Mental Illness More Often Crime Victims,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, at 16 (noting that a recent study found that
―[m]ore than one-fourth of persons with severe mental illness are victims of
violent crime in the course of a year, a rate 11 times higher than that of the
general population‖). Although PWMI are disproportionately the victims of
crimes, more attention is often paid to their role in the criminal justice system as
alleged perpetrators. In recent years, increasing attention has been focused on
the criminalization of mental illness and the inability of courts to meet the needs
of PWMI who stand accused or who accuse others of committing criminal acts
against them. See generally J. Steven Lamberti & Robert L. Weisman, Persons
with Severe Mental Disorders in the Criminal Justice System: Challenges and
Opportunities, 75 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 151 (2004); Michael D. Thompson, Melissa
Reuland & Daniel Souweiene, Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus:
Improving Responses to People with Mental Illness, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
30 (2003).
30
See, e.g., People v. Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978)
(―Evidence of the mental illness of a witness is a fact that a jury is entitled to
know so that it may ‗. . . assess and evaluate the testimony given by him and not
accept it . . . as the statement of a ‗normal‘ individual.‘‖) (quoting People v.
Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213–14 (1964)).
31
See, e.g., Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d at 213–15.
32
See Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 875–76 (―Where, as here, there is knowledge
29
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because, as discussed in Section II.B below, most mental illnesses
do not have a bearing on an individual‘s ability to recount events
accurately.
The Federal Rape Shield Law provides a good example of the
limited protection that exclusionary rules often provide for crime
victims or witnesses who have histories of mental health problems.
As codified by Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Federal Rape Shield Law ―broadly reflects the rejection of a
system that conflated a woman‘s chastity with her credibility.‖ 33
With certain limited exceptions, ―[e]vidence offered to prove that
any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior,‖ and
―[e]vidence offered to prove any alleged victim‘s sexual
predisposition‖ is inadmissible in ―any civil or criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct.‖34
However, the Federal Rape Shield Law ―leave[s] at least one
large gap. In most states, neither the rape shield law, the other rules
of evidence, nor the case law set out comprehensive guidelines for
the admissibility of evidence of the complainant‘s mental
health.‖35 As a result, subject to other evidentiary rules,
―defendants may still request a review of a complainant‘s mental
health history, a mental examination, or cross-examination as to a
history of psychological problems.‖ 36 This is a significant gap
because, according to one study, PWMI are ―23 times more likely
to be raped than . . . the general population.‖ 37 As discussed in
or a long-standing, ongoing mental condition of a complainant who is the sole
eyewitness to the crime, and where such condition may affect the accuracy,
perception and comprehension of his testimony, evidence must be disclosed to
the defendants concerning such a condition.‖) (emphasis added).
33
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the
Credibility of a Sexual Assault Complainant, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1374
(2005).
34
FED. R. EVID. 412(a); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney
2008).
35
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 33, at 1374.
36
Id.
37
Levin, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that a recent study found that ―[m]ore
than one-fourth of persons with severe mental illness are victims of violent
crime in the course of a year, a rate 11 times higher than that of the general
population‖).
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Parts II.B and III.B below, the idea that it is always necessary for a
jury to hear about a witness‘s mental health diagnosis to evaluate
her testimony is contradicted by clinical information that indicates
that most mental illnesses do not affect a person‘s ability to
perceive events or her ability to recount them.
3.

Credibility Assessments by Factfinders

If an individual with mental illness is found to have the
capacity to testify, the factfinder is responsible for assessing his or
her credibility. 38 Similarly, if evidence of the witness‘s mental
illness is admitted by the court, the factfinder is charged with
deciding how, if at all, that evidence affects the weight of the
witness‘s testimony. 39
As one commentator has pointed out, even though ―[t]he
evaluation of witness credibility is crucial to the process of factfinding, . . . there is no law of witness credibility.‖ 40 Factfinders
have considerable discretion in determining how to weigh the
evidence that has been admitted. Absent ―glaring error,‖ that
discretion goes unchecked by the appellate courts.41
Factfinders, however, are not always left to their own devices.
Some courts have allowed for the use of so-called ―framing
testimony‖ by experts to give the factfinder input or guidance as to
how the evidence should be weighed. One form of framing
testimony is criteria-based content analysis (CBCA).42 CBCA has
38

See FED. R. EVID. 104(e); see also Hon. James P. Timony, Demeanor
Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 904–05 (2000).
39
See FED. R. EVID. 104(e); see also Steven I. Friedland, On Common
Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165,
178–80 (1990).
40
Morris D. Bernstein, Judging Witness Credibility: A Talmudic
Perspective, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION. 4, 4 (2003).
41
Id. (―It is a foundational principle that, absent glaring error by the trial
court, an appellate court will not review the findings of fact made at trial.‖).
42
CBCA is a technique used by a psychiatrist or psychologist to attempt to
determine the veracity of a statement by evaluating its verbal content. See C.L.
Ruby & John C. Brigham, The Usefulness of the Criteria-Based Content
Analysis Technique in Distinguishing Between Truthful and Fabricated
Allegations: A Critical Review, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 705, 705 (1997).
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been used in some American courts as an aid in assessing the
credibility of statements made by children in the context of abuse
cases. 43 In general, however, studies on the efficacy of CBCA have
yielded ―mixed results.‖44
Similarly, courts often allow expert witnesses to testify about
the credibility of eyewitness identifications. 45 Eyewitness expert
testimony is a form of ―social framework testimony.‖ 46 Social
framework testimony ―presents ‗general conclusions from social
science research‘‖ and provides a ―context or framework for
evaluating what eyewitnesses report—but the jurors do the
evaluating.‖47 Instead of commenting upon the credibility of the
identification itself, eyewitness expert testimony ―explains what
scientists know about how factors that may have been operating in
the case at trial increase or decrease the likelihood of eyewitness
accuracy.‖48
Factfinders are generally prone to give too much weight to
eyewitness testimony, yet, in our experience, they often improperly
discount the eyewitness testimony of PWMI. In situations where
the mental illness itself is central to the lawsuit, framing testimony
by a mental health professional can be used to prevent a PWMI
from being unfairly discredited. A mental health professional can
discuss modern clinical research findings, like those presented in
Part II below,49 in order to provide context for the factfinder who is
charged with evaluating the testimony of a PWMI. Where the
43

Id. at 705–06.
See id. at 716.
45
See People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452 (2007) (holding that it is an
abuse of discretion for a court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness identification ―where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the
defendant to the crime‖); but see Decision of the Day, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 2008,
at 18 (denying appeal in People v. Abney based on court‘s refusal to permit the
defense to present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
identifications because there was evidence corroborating the identification).
46
Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony about Eyewitness
Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 909, 910 (1995).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 922.
49
See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text.
44
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mental illness is of a variety that may impede perception of reality
or ability to communicate, a mental health professional can also
elucidate what symptoms may or may not impact the testimony.
Although there may be objections to offering such framing
testimony, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that
―[i]f scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise . . . .‖50
B. Misapplications and Shortcomings of the Law Regarding
Capacity and Credibility
1.

The Inaccurate Assumption that Lack of
Capacity in One Area Means Lack of
Capacity in All Areas

An individual may have diminished capacity in one area of his
or her life while retaining capacity in others. As discussed in Part
I.A.1, the New York Mental Hygiene Law requires courts to tailor
guardianship orders to afford an incapacitated individual the
maximum amount of independence possible. 51 In practice,
however, legal analysis often conflicts with established
jurisprudence because judges fail to appreciate the complexity of
the concept of capacity.
One example of this is apparent from a 2006 housing court
case in which MFY represented a resident of an adult home. In this
case, the administration of an adult home barred a resident from
returning to the home after a psychiatric hospital stay because she
allegedly signed an agreement to voluntarily relinquish her
residency rights while she was in the hospital. 52 During a pre-trial
conference, an MFY attorney indicated that the resident would

50

FED. R. EVID. 702.
See supra notes 6–14 and accompanying text.
52
See Hemans v. Lakeside Manor Home for Adults, No. 010693/06 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. July 18, 2006) (unpublished decision) (copy on file at MFY).
51

CREMIN_6-5-09

470

6/6/2009 12:41 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

testify that she had been fraudulently induced into signing the
agreement.53 Although the MFY attorney did not raise the issue of
capacity, the judge responded by stating that if the resident did not
have the capacity to sign the paper, she would not have the
capacity to testify about it. The judge essentially recast the
attorney‘s argument about the adult home operator‘s alleged
misconduct into one implicating the resident‘s capacity. It is
extremely unlikely that the judge would have raised the issue of
capacity if the resident had been hospitalized for a physical
ailment. The judge‘s statement is an example of inappropriate
assumptions that litigants who are known to have mental health
problems face regarding their capacity.
Given how courts often view the capacity of PWMI, it is not
surprising that PWMI are often excluded from the witness stand or
even the courtroom itself. In the Department of Health (DOH)
proceeding discussed in the introduction, residents were not called
as witnesses during the hearing and were barred from even
attending it.54 This was true even though investigations of
numerous complaints made by residents of the adult home served
as the basis for the proceeding and the residents themselves had a
great deal at stake in its outcome. 55 In making this determination,
the ALJ cited the privacy of those residents whose complaints were
being discussed as a justification for their exclusion. 56 It is
troubling that, given the strong policy that favors open hearings,
53

The information in this sentence and in the rest of the paragraph is based
on the attorney‘s recollection of the pre-trial conference. In this case, the
resident was allowed to testify. Unfortunately, however, because she admitted to
having signed the paper, the judge disregarded testimony by both the resident
and various clinicians that she had believed she was signing a receipt for her
allowance. Although the resident‘s argument was that the operator had
misrepresented the nature of the document to her, the court again seemed to
recast the argument as one about the resident‘s competency, simply ignoring the
numerous points on which the testimony of the resident‘s witnesses about the
circumstances under which the document was signed conflicted with the
accounts given by the operator‘s witnesses.
54
See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra
note 1, at 5, 8.
55
See id., at 8–21, 27.
56
See id. at ALJ I.
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the administrative officials did not make more of an effort to
structure the hearing in such a way that residents‘ privacy could be
protected without excluding the people who had a strong interest in
its outcome. MFY had suggested, for example, that pseudonyms be
used for evidence that included individual residents‘ names. This
suggestion was rejected without explanation. Interestingly,
however, the ALJ adopted such an approach in his Report and
Decision, where he used initials or numbers to refer to the
residents.57
2. The Inaccurate Assumption that
Mental Illness Makes Testimony
Inherently Unreliable
Even when PWMI are allowed to testify at a hearing, their
testimony is often severely discounted by factfinders. 58 Factfinders
often allow prejudices about mental illnesses to interfere with an
accurate weighing of the credibility of witnesses who have a
history of mental illness.59 Court personnel frequently assume
PWMI cannot tell the truth, or worse, purposely do not tell the
truth. Unfortunately, little is done to challenge the widely-held
belief that a witness with a mental illness is unlikely to be able to
tell the truth on the stand.
Susan Stefan, a prominent disability law attorney at the Center
for Public Representation, has written persuasively that PWMI
generally are put into one of two categories: those who are
―discredited‖ and those who are ―discreditable.‖60 Although there
57

See id. at 5.
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. Determination of
credibility is a jury function, although where a jury is making this determination
the judge still plays a role when giving the jury instructions. In administrative
and many housing proceedings and other civil court cases, however, the judge
determines credibility because there is no jury. Id.
59
Bernstein, supra note 40, at 53 (pointing out that because factfinders
often ―mechanically impose[] a stock character type upon the witness,‖ an
administrative law judge, for example, ―might, unbeknownst to herself, be
making her determinations based upon a gallery of mental images of
presumptively credible witnesses‖).
60
Stefan, supra note 4, at 1349 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
58
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are key differences between the two groups, ―[n]either group is
believed or credited when they report their own perceptions of
their situations.‖61 Thus, for PWMI, ―credibility is . . . a primary
issue.‖62
The defense attorney quoted at the beginning of this Article
tried to discredit a resident of an adult home by equating having a
mental illness with being a ―liar.‖ 63 In that proceeding, the adult
home operator had a history of serious complaints against him and
a previous finding that his extensive violations merited nonrenewal of his operating certificate.64 However, despite these
circumstances and evidence that the staff of the home had falsified
records that it provided to DOH inspectors, the ALJ allowed the
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 4 (1963)).
61
Id. at 1378.
62
Id. at 1379.
63
See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra
note 1, at 522–24.
64
See Richard Perez-Pena, 5 From Adult Home Die, Trapped in Burning
Van, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1 (―Brooklyn Manor has long been known
as one of the worst homes, according to records and state officials. Over the
years, its operators have been cited for a number of violations and abuses that
included lack of heat, swarming flies, staff shortages, failures to provide medical
aid and employee assaults on patients. Last year, a fire killed a resident in his
bed.‖); Marc Santora, Stuck in a Bad Place; With Few Options, State Lets
Troubled Adult Home Stay Open, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 1, at 37 (―As
early as 1991, state investigators found problems at Brooklyn Manor,
uncovering evidence that the operator of the home, Benito Fernandez, . . . took
more than $45,000 in retirement benefits from a resident who had entrusted the
money to the home [and that] [o]ver the ensuing years, more reports by state
investigators found that not only was money being misappropriated, but that the
level of supervision and coordination of care was abysmal.‖); see also New
York State Coalition for Adult Home Reform, Brooklyn Manor: A Timeline of
Tragedy,
http://www.scaany.org/collaborations/documents/brooklyn_manor_
timeline.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2008). The decision, issued on March 7, 1996,
affirmed the regulators‘ decision not to renew Fernandez‘s operating certificate
on the ground that he lacked the requisite moral character to run an adult home.
Although the case—which was commenced by the Department of Social
Services—lasted two and a half years, and although the decision was based on
forty-two days of testimony and numerous exhibits, the State inexplicably
withdrew its case against Fernandez after the decision was issued. The State of
New York later re-issued Fernandez‘ operating certificate.

CREMIN_6-5-09

6/6/2009 12:41 PM

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MENTAL ILLNESS

473

operator to retain his license. 65 Various factors contributed to this
ruling, but the ALJ emphasized in his decision that the DOH
inspector whose testimony was crucial to the DOH‘s case had
―failed to check residents‘ records to see if [they] revealed histories
of making false accusations.‖66 The ALJ therefore appeared to
follow the lead of the defense attorney in assuming that PWMI are
liars and placed the burden on them or their advocates to prove
otherwise, even in the face of significant evidence that the staff of
the home were the ones guilty of making false statements.
II. CLINICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CAPACITY AND
CREDIBILITY OF PWMI
References to reliable modern clinical information about
mental illness are lacking in much of the jurisprudence about
competency and credibility of PWMI. The assumption in many
cases seems to be that any history of mental illness is enough to
impugn an individual‘s ability to perceive or recount events in a
credible manner. Clinical evidence in the mental health literature,
however, indicates otherwise.
There does not appear to be a large body of mental health
literature specifically addressing the capacity of PWMI to testify in
civil proceedings. 67 However, information available in the medical
psychiatric literature supports the claim that having a particular
mental health condition does not necessarily mean that an
individual is incompetent or, in modern clinical terminology,
―lacks capacity.‖68 There is also substantial clinical evidence to
support the notion that it is not possible to make generalizations
65

See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra
note 1, at 51.
66
See id. at 27.
67
The authors have not found any mental health literature specifically
addressing this issue.
68
See Thomas S. Zaubler, Milton Viederman & Joseph J. Fins, Ethical,
Legal and Psychiatric Issues in Capacity, Competency and Informed Consent:
An Annotated Bibliography, 18 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 155, 162–63 (1996);
Laura Weiss Roberts, Evidence-based Ethics and Informed Consent in Mental
Illness Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 540, 540–41 (2000).
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regarding an individual‘s ability to provide accurate information
simply based on whether that individual has a psychiatric diagnosis
or a mental health history. 69 Mental health research data supports
the assertion that such determinations require case-by-case
analyses.
A. Research on Determining Capacity
In assessing the capacity of an individual, an experienced
clinician70 will utilize different forms of mental examination and
interviewing techniques to determine if certain criteria are met.
Basic criteria for determining capacity routinely include, among
other things, the individual‘s ability to: (1) express a choice,
(2) understand relevant information, (3) demonstrate an
understanding of the circumstances and consequences relevant to
the current situation, and (4) rationally manipulate information to
some degree, mainly as it relates to the situation at hand. 71 As with
69

See Zaubler et al., supra note 68, at 162–63; see generally Roberts, supra
note 68, at 540 (discussing nuances in determining capacity in individuals with
―serious psychotic symptoms‖ for the purpose of ethically obtaining their
informed consent to participate in mental health research protocols).
70
The term ―clinician‖ refers to ―an individual qualified in the clinical
practice of medicine, psychiatry, or psychology as distinguished from one
specializing in laboratory or research techniques or in theory.‖ Medline Plus,
http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=
clinician (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). It is important to note that knowing how to
gather and appropriately use relevant medical, psychiatric, and other personal
history, in a way which may aid the assessment of capacity without
unnecessarily violating a person‘s confidentiality or unjustly impugning
credibility, is a skill that requires proper training, experience and often the
professional ethics of a licensed mental health practitioner who may be in the
best position to offer such an opinion.
71
See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment,
19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 109–11 (1995) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Grisso,
MacArthur Study I]; Roberts, supra note 68, at 540; see generally Janet I.
Warren et al., Opinion Formation in Evaluating the Adjudicative Competence
and Restorability of Criminal Defendants: A Review of 8,000 Evaluations, 24
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (2006) (analyzing criminal forensic evaluations conducted
by clinicians in Virginia during a twelve year period).
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any type of medical or health condition, which may fluctuate or be
completely ameliorated with proper care and treatment,
assessments of capacity need to be updated regularly to reflect
current mental status.72
When applying these criteria in evaluating PWMI, it is
important to understand that the presence of certain psychiatric
signs and symptoms alone does not necessarily require a
determination of incapacity. 73 Certain mental illnesses, such as
non-psychotic mood and anxiety disorders, may have little or no
impact on an individual‘s ability to perceive reality or accurately
recall past events.74 Other mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia
or mood and anxiety disorders accompanied by psychotic
symptoms, may affect perception in certain instances, but not in
ways that necessarily implicate or impede the ability to testify
accurately. 75

72

See Appelbaum & Grisso, MacArthur Study I, supra note 71, at 121–22;
Zaubler et al., supra note 68, at 162–63; Warren et al., supra note 71, at 120–21;
Roberts, supra note 68, at 540.
73
See Appelbaum & Grisso, MacArthur Study I, supra note 71, at 107;
Zaubler et al., supra note 68; Warren et al., supra note 71; Roberts, supra note
68. The MacCAT-T is an established clinical instrument that is frequently
employed to determine the competence of psychiatric patients to make informed
treatment decisions on a case-by-case basis. See generally Thomas. Grisso, Paul
S. Appelbaum & Carolyn Hill-Fotouhi, The MacCAT-T: A Clinical Tool to
Assess Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 48 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1415 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso et al., The MacCAT-T].
74
See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for
Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1033 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make
Treatment Decisions]; Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study. II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent
to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso et al.,
MacArthur Study II].
75
See Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions,
supra note 74; Grisso et al., MacArthur Study II, supra note 74; Grisso et al.,
The MacCAT-T, supra note 73; Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 171–
73 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, MacArthur Study III]; Scott Y.H.
Kim et al., Determining When Impairment Constitutes Incapacity for Informed
Consent in Schizophrenia Research, 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 38, 40–41 (2007).
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Psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations, are rarely
constant and are often specific in nature. An auditory hallucination,
for example, may frequently involve a person hearing a particular,
repeated voice or sound.76 Therefore, hallucinations may be
discrete and distinguishable from other occurrences in a person‘s
daily life. 77 Psychotic delusions, or beliefs not based in reality, are
also frequently discrete, specific to one area of a person‘s life, and
do not necessarily affect a person‘s functional status generally. 78
Training in interviewing PWMI and access to relevant
background information regarding the interviewee are necessary
components in evaluating an individual‘s capacity. A typical
mental status interview includes determining whether an individual
is oriented to his or her surroundings, including person, place, and
time.79 In addition, experienced clinicians frequently employ
various interviewing tools in evaluating an individual‘s cognitive
ability. 80 As evidenced by some of the landmark psychiatric studies
of capacity for informed consent cited above, 81 such tests are
routinely performed because a person‘s level of capacity or
incapacity to perceive reality and recall past events can never be
assumed based solely on the presence of a mental health diagnosis.
Where there is concern about a witness‘s ability to testify
accurately, relevant and properly obtained clinical information can
be extremely helpful in evaluating the testimony.

76

See Michael Garrett & Raul Silva, Auditory Hallucinations, Source
Monitoring, and the Belief That “Voices” Are Real, 29 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
445, 449 (2003).
77
See id. at 452–53.
78
See Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions,
supra note 74; Grisso et al., MacArthur Study II, supra note 74; Grisso et al.,
The MacCAT-T, supra note 73.
79
See HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF
PSYCHIATRY 200–04 (1991) (providing details of a mental status examination);
see also John Donnelly, Mervin Rosenberg & William P. Fleeson, The Evolution
of the Mental Status—Past and Future, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 997, 998 (1970)
(describing the development of ―an organized, systematic methodology‖ for
mental status examinations).
80
See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 79.
81
See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
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B. Research on Determining Credibility
There is little literature that directly addresses the issue of
determining the credibility of PWMI in civil court proceedings.
What is available, however, suggests that PWMI are no more
likely to exhibit criminal or exploitive behaviors such as chronic,
intentional lying than individuals who do not have major mental
illness.82 Although people who have chronic mental illness are
more often arrested for ―nuisance‖ type crimes as a consequence of
exhibiting psychiatric symptoms in public, these activities are
clearly not what is generally considered to be criminal behavior.83
Research shows that lying is somewhat commonplace in the
general population. For example, one study concluded that
―American college students on average tell two lies a day, and
ordinary people in the community one a day.‖ 84 Research also
indicates that ―some people lie more than others,‖ and ―that those
who tell more lies are more manipulative, more concerned with
self-presentation, and more sociable, but less socialized.‖85 In
general, it is not easy to detect when someone is lying; ―a number
of studies have demonstrated that people are poor lie detectors,
being able to identify lies in experimental studies at about chance
82

See Paul S. Appelbaum, Pamela Clark Robbins & John Monahan,
Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 571 (2000); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T.
Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism Among Schizophrenic and
Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 397, 404–05 (1992);
Jennifer L. Skeem & Edward P. Mulvey, Psychopathy and Community Violence
Among Civil Psychiatric Patients: Results from the MacArthur Violence Risk
Assessment Study, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 358, 369–70
(2001).
83
See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe
Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
483(1998), available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content
/full/49/4/483#R494105; Gold Award Article, Helping Mentally Ill People
Break the Cycle of Jail and Homelessness: The Thresholds, State, County,
Collaborative Jail Linkage Project, Chicago, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1380,
1380–81 (2001).
84
Don Grubin, Commentary: Getting at the Truth about Pathological
Lying, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 350, 350 (2005).
85
Id. at 351.
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rates, and sometimes below chance.‖86
What is predictive in terms of determining which individuals
are more likely to be chronic liars or exhibit other acts of
criminality is a cluster of behaviors and behavioral patterns
characterized as ―psychopathy.‖ The term psychopathy, described
by psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley in 1964, refers to certain
behaviors or patterns of behavior that involve the chronic
exploitation or violation of the rights of others. 87 Individuals who
exhibit repeated patterns of these behaviors are frequently
described by mental health professionals as having ―antisocial
personality traits‖ or ―antisocial personality disorder.‖ 88 As many
in the legal and criminal justice professions know, people with
antisocial personality disorder may be as inconspicuous, in terms
of their superficial behavior and appearance, as anyone else in the
general population.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Volume IV TR (DSMIVTR) is used by mental health professionals
to classify and characterize varying forms of mental illnesses
according to different historical, observable, and symptomatic
86

Id. Technological improvements may lead to better tools for lie
detection—and difficult constitutional questions for courts—in the future. See
Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 359, 360–61 (2007)
(noting that ―[s]everal new technologies use measurements of blood flow or
electrical impulses in the brain to identify distinct indicators of deceptive
communication,‖ but that ―[e]ven the most accurate lie detection techniques are,
at this point, unproven‖). See also Joseph H. Baskin, Judith G. Edersheim &
Bruce H. Price, Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the
Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 265 (2007) (noting that ―[s]everal new
studies have posited that MRIs can be successfully used to identify brain
changes in individuals who fabricate information‖ and that ―[t]his information
could benefit both civil and criminal litigation‖); Yaling Yang et al., Prefrontal
White Matter in Pathological Liars, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 320, 321–22
(2005) (finding that the prefrontal cortex of ―liars‖ showed an average increase
of twenty-two percent in the amount of ―white matter‖ and a decrease in the
amount of grey matter).
87
HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 362–63 (4th ed. 1964).
88
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION TEXT REVISION 701–06
(2000).
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criteria.89 Antisocial personality disorder is defined by, among
other characteristics, a historical and repetitive pattern of
intentional deception and exploitation of others.90 In contrast, there
is no reference to exploitative or intentionally deceptive behavior
in the list of criteria for chronic mental disorders such as
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other mood and anxiety
disorders.91 In terms of diagnostic DSMIVTR criteria, there is
therefore no direct, necessary connection between psychopathic
behavior and having these major mental disorders, just as there is
no such direct, necessary connection in people who do not have a
major mental illness.
In terms of assessing tendencies for psychopathic behavior, the
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R) is one of the most wellestablished (in terms of statistical validity and reliability) and
frequently used tools to evaluate and predict an individual‘s
potential for exhibiting such behaviors. 92 PCL–R scores have also
been shown to be a valid means of evaluating degrees of
psychopathy.93 In general, higher PCL–R scores are predictive of
greater tendencies toward criminal behaviors. 94 This evaluative
tool has been useful in predicting such behavior among various
populations, including both incarcerated and unincarcerated
groups.95 As would be expected, in general higher PCL–R scores
89

See generally id.
See id. at 701–06.
91
See id. at 297–331, 345–400, 429–76.
92
See ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST–REVISED:
PCL-R (2d ed. 2003).
93
See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 37–60 (2001);
Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 25, 25–28, 30–32, 36–41 (1996); Martin Hildebrand,
Corine De Ruiter & Henk Nijman, PCL-R Psychopathy Predicts Disruptive
Behavior Among Male Offenders in a Dutch Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, 19
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 13, 23–24 (2004).
94
See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93; Marnie E. Rice, Violent Offender
Research and Implications for the Criminal Justice System, 52 AM. PSYCHOL.
414, 414–18 (1997).
95
See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93; Marnie E. Rice, Grant T. Harris &
Catherine A. Cormier, An Evaluation of a Maximum Security Therapeutic
90
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have been found in individuals who are either incarcerated or who
have significant criminal histories.
Research also indicates that individuals with psychiatric
illnesses who have significant criminal histories exhibit higher
levels of psychopathy. 96 Similarly, non-mentally ill people who
have come into significant contact with the criminal justice system
(and even such individuals who have not had legal problems per se
but who admit to violence and other antisocial acts) also score
higher on established psychopathy measures, supporting the
assertion that these measures are reliable predictors of violence and
criminality. 97
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 98 which was
a landmark investigation of potential dangerousness among people
with psychotic delusions, further dispelled widely-held beliefs
about PWMI being a more violent, criminally-predisposed group.
This study and others have concluded that even those PWMI who
tend to be most obviously ill with frank delusions are not
necessarily more likely to commit violent acts than the general
population.99
Community for Psychopaths and Other Mentally Disordered Offenders, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 399, 399–400, 408 (1992); Michael R. Levenson, Kent A. Kiehl
& Cory M. Fitzpatrick, Assessing Psychopathic Attributes in a Noninstitutionalized Population, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151 (1995).
96
See C.D. Hill, R. Rogers & M.E. Bickford, Predicting Aggressive and
Socially Disruptive Behavior in a Maximum Security Forensic Psychiatric
Hospital, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 56, 56–59 (1996); Grant T. Harris, Marnie E. Rice
& Vernon L. Quinsey, Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders:
The Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM., JUST. &
BEHAV. 315, 315–33 (1993); Hildebrand et al., supra note 93, at 16–26.
97
See Ralph C. Serin, Violent Recidivism in Criminal Psychopaths, 20 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 207 (1996); Ralph C. Serin, Psychopathy and Violence in
Criminals, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 423, 423–30 (1991); Rice, supra note
94, at 421–23; David DeMatteo, Kirk Heilbrun & Geoffrey Marczyk, An
Empirical Investigation of Psychopathy in a Noninstitutionalized and
Noncriminal Sample, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 133, 133–46 (2006).
98
See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93.
99
See id.; Appelbaum, Robbins & Monahan, supra note 82; Thomas
Stompe, Gerhard Ortwein-Swoboda & Hans Schanda, Schizophrenia,
Delusional Symptoms and Violence: The Threat/Control-Override Concept
Reexamined, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 31, 40–41 (2004); Paul S. Appelbaum,
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Accordingly, individuals having a primary psychiatric
diagnosis alone (i.e., a mood, anxiety or psychotic disorder) are not
more likely to exhibit psychopathic or antisocial behavior than
those who have not been so diagnosed. Some studies have even
indicated that non-psychopathic people with mental illness have a
lower likelihood of physical aggression, beyond self-directed
aggressive acts of suicide attempts and self-mutilation.100
Admittedly, there is limited data that exclusively addresses the
issue of lying under oath in court proceedings. The extensive body
of literature available on the subject of psychopathic behavior,
however, indicates that people with chronic mental illness who do
not have criminal histories (apart from arrests for ―nuisance‖ type
crimes) do not have any higher levels of psychopathy or tendencies
toward deceitfulness than their non-criminal, non-mentally ill
counterparts in the general population. 101
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this part, we set forth recommendations that would improve
the ability of courts to provide PWMI with fair hearings. These
recommendations include: (1) providing training for court
personnel, advocates, and guardians ad litem (GALs) to improve
their understanding of mental illness and PWMI; (2) enforcing
legal and evidentiary standards in light of modern clinical research
findings; and (3) providing reasonable accommodations that would
assist PWMI to access the court system in order to prosecute or
defend their rights adequately.
A. Recommendation 1: Mental Health Training Should be
Provided to Court Personnel, Advocates, and GALs
When considering the problems PWMI encounter in civil and
administrative proceedings and contemplating what solutions may
One Madman Keeping Loaded Guns: Misconceptions of Mental Illness and
Their Legal Consequences, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1105, 1106 (2004).
100
Hill, et al., supra note 96, at 58.
101
See Appelbaum, Robbins & Monahan, supra note 82; Rice & Harris,
supra note 82; Skeem & Mulvey, supra note 82.

CREMIN_6-5-09

482

6/6/2009 12:41 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

exist, it is instructive to examine recent developments in the
criminal justice setting. In response to widespread discontent with
the way criminal defendants with mental illnesses were treated in
traditional criminal courts, many states, including New York, have
established what are known as mental health courts. 102
A mental health court typically has a staff dedicated to the
court part, including not only a judge and other court personnel but
also a mental health case worker.103 Personnel are given specific
training in communicating effectively with PWMI. 104 The court
then works with prosecutors and defense attorneys to develop a
plan that offers defendants opportunities to receive treatment
instead of punishment and to connect them with treatment facilities
and other services in the community. 105 Although long-term data
on the effectiveness of these efforts are limited, they appear to
represent a much needed initiative to address the needs of PWMI
in the criminal justice system. 106 There is no reason to think that
102

See DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING
DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 7–8 (2001), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/mental_health.pdf.
103
See id. at 9.
104
See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Role of Mental Health
Courts in System Reform, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/criminalization/
publications/mentalhealthcourts/index.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
105
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 102, at 10.
106
This is not to say that mental health courts are not without their
problems. As Wolff has pointed out, ―[m]ental health courts create stigma by
segregating people by illness and then defining their uniqueness and
irresponsibility in terms of the illness. Furthermore, labeling the court a ‗mental
health‘ court, focuses public attention on psychiatric issues, and amplifies the
mark associated with the court.‖ Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents:
Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 431, 434 (2002). Wolff also points out that ―[m]ental health
courts assume uncritically that criminal behavior is caused by a psychiatric
problem‖ and ignore ―socioeconomic and historical factors that predispose
[individuals] to committing crimes.‖ Id. at 432. A study published by the
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law also pointed out flaws or limitations of
the mental health court model. One conclusion was that ―[m]any of the existing
courts include practices that are unnecessarily burdensome to defendants, that
make it harder for them to reintegrate into the community and that may
compromise their rights.‖ Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Role of
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similar efforts would not be beneficial to the PWMI and the
personnel who deal with them in the civil court system as well.
Training that challenges biases against PWMI and equips court
personnel to communicate more effectively with them should also
be expanded beyond specialized court parts. PWMI generally do
not appear different from other people and many litigants with
mental illness do not wish to disclose their diagnoses. Even when a
mental illness is obviously present or must be revealed during
litigation, the continued social stigma associated with mental
illness may cause some litigants to opt out of a specialized court
part. For this reason and others, all court personnel, as well as
advocates, should be given training to understand mental illness.
As a consequence of stigma and potentially debilitating
symptoms, PWMI are often at a great disadvantage when
attempting to advocate for themselves in a court system that is
generally ill-equipped to accommodate them. A primary goal in
training court personnel and advocates should be to sensitize them
to any misperceptions or biases they might have toward PWMI.
Such training should not supplant the use, where appropriate, of
clinical expertise during litigation. It should, however, provide a
basic background in the complexity of mental illness, the dangers
of lumping into one category all those who have mental illnesses,
and the need to avoid drawing unwarranted conclusions about the
relevance of a mental disability to a legal proceeding.
In addition to some clinical background, all advocates and
personnel who might come in professional contact with PWMI
should be trained on ways in which they might communicate more
effectively with litigants and witnesses with mental illnesses. The
goal is not to transform all court personnel into pseudotherapists—in fact, care should be taken to discourage judges from
assuming the role that has been referred to in the criminal justice
context as ―psychologists in black robes.‖ 107 However, a shift in
Mental Health Courts in System Reform, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/
criminalization/publications/mentalhealthcourts/index.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2009). This study also pointed out that a mental health court cannot be ―effective
unless the services and supports that individuals with serious mental illnesses
need to live in the community are available.‖ Id.
107
DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 102, at 19.
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attitude and some simple interviewing techniques can be extremely
helpful in eliciting information from those whose mental illnesses
interfere with their ability to communicate clearly at times. For
example, setting ground rules during interviews, redirecting clients
who tend to be over-inclusive or tangential, and explaining why
certain questions are being asked, may all help in gathering the
information they need to provide quality representation.
Interviewing litigants with certain mental illnesses may require
added patience. However, advocates who are willing to assist
clients with mental illnesses through the sometimes more timeconsuming process of fact-finding interviews may be rewarded
with vital information that cannot be obtained through any other
means. Several years ago, an attorney from MFY received reports
that several female residents of an adult home had been repeatedly
sexually assaulted by an administrator of the home. The attorney
spent a great deal of time interviewing each of the residents
because all were in a state of decompensation at the time, and their
delusions about other areas of their lives often led them off the
track of the questions being asked.108 However, by persisting
through these at times challenging interviews, the attorney
involved noted that every victim reported a few very specific
details pertaining to the occurrence of the alleged crimes. Culling
these consistent details from their tangential accounts bolstered the
credibility of her report to the enforcement agency responsible for
overseeing adult homes. 109
MFY attorneys are frequently required to gather information
from clients with various communication difficulties. It requires
patience, empathy, and, as a threshold matter, an avoidance of the

108

The victims in this case were all delusional. One result of systemic
failure to listen to people with delusions is a tendency on the part of
unscrupulous individuals to target such people as victims, assuming that such
victims will not report the abuse, or that if they report the abuse, they will not be
believed.
109
Unfortunately, the Department of Social Services (DSS), then in charge
of overseeing adult homes, handled this complaint merely by interviewing the
accused, who, not surprisingly, denied the allegations. DSS took no action
against the home, and the administrator, although he did not continue in the
position, went on to work at a health care facility.
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assumption that because a client is mentally ill, he or she will not
be able to tell the truth. Although most attorneys at MFY have no
formal training in mental health, periodic in-house trainings by
mental health professionals, as well as experience communicating
with clients with mental illnesses, have helped them conduct
productive interviews with clients who have severe thought and
speech pattern disturbances. This experience has shown that basic
training can lead to greater understanding.
Training is particularly important for GALs. Some litigants
with mental illnesses, while capable of managing their own day-today affairs, lack the capacity to participate in certain aspects of
their own cases and may benefit from the appointment of a
GAL.110 GALs are appointed by the court at the request of litigants
or by the court sua sponte where it appears that the party in
question is ―incapable of adequately prosecuting or defending‖ his
or her rights.111 A GAL may discharge various functions that his or
her ward, but for a mental disability, would do to prosecute or
defend a case. In some cases, this may include applying for public
benefits in a non-payment eviction proceeding or seeking
assistance from the state‘s Adult Protective Services program to
address a clutter problem in a nuisance eviction proceeding.112 It
may also include a factual investigation of the ward‘s possible
claims or defenses. 113
A properly trained GAL may be of tremendous assistance in
ensuring that an individual with mental illness receives a fair
hearing. However, the appointment of a GAL who is not properly
trained may simply have the affect of replicating unjust aspects of

110

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2008); see generally Jeanette
Zelhof, Andrew Goldberg & Hina Shamsi, Protecting the Rights of Litigants
with Diminished Capacity in the New York City Housing Courts, 3 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 733 (2006).
111
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2008). Again, it should be stressed that
the need for a GAL specifically addresses the inability to participate effectively
in a court case. It should not be assumed that every litigant with a mental illness
requires a GAL, nor should it be assumed that someone who requires a GAL
lacks competence to give testimony or lacks credibility.
112
See Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 763.
113
See id.
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the court system and potentially harming the litigant.
B. Recommendation 2: Legal and Evidentiary Standards
Should be Enforced in Light of Modern Clinical
Research Findings
Certain legal standards, particularly related to the relevance of
mental health history and the credibility of testimony by PWMI,
should be enforced in light of current knowledge about mental
illness. The idea that it is always necessary for a jury to hear about
a witness‘s mental health diagnosis to evaluate her testimony is
contradicted by clinical information that indicates that most mental
illnesses do not affect a person‘s ability to perceive events or her
ability to recount them. The generalizations that courts make
concerning the admissibility of a witness‘s mental health history
should be re-examined, particularly when the person giving
testimony is the litigant and his or her rights may be unfairly
prejudiced by the admission or misuse of mental health
information.
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan has argued that ―most
jurisdictions are overly permissive in admitting evidence of the
accuser‘s psychiatric make-up and history‖ in civil and criminal
cases involving sexual misconduct.114 In making this argument, she
notes that, because ―courts implicitly rely on outdated and
inaccurate conceptions of psychiatric practice, it is too easy for
defendants to introduce evidence that has no logical bearing on the
complainant‘s credibility but will nonetheless prejudice the jury
against her.‖115
This argument is generally applicable to the use of such
evidence to impeach the credibility of PWMI. Due to the limited
probative value and the considerable prejudicial effect of mental
health evidence, ―most psychological evidence should be
inadmissible because its relevance is substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effects.‖116 There are at least two reasons for this
114
115
116

Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 33, at 1375.
Id.
Id.
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conclusion. First, psychology is ―often misunderstood by courts
and juries alike.‖117 The admission of evidence of a litigant‘s or
witness‘s mental health history can therefore ―create prejudice and
confusion for the court and jury.‖118 Second, the admission of such
evidence can also ―humiliate the [litigant or witness].‖119 The
likelihood of such evidence being admitted into evidence may
therefore deter PWMI who are potential litigants from seeking
justice.
Evidence of a witness‘s mental health history is probative only
if it holds ―a specific and scientifically legitimate relevance to the
[witness‘s] credibility.‖ 120 Even then, the probative value of such
evidence ―should be balanced against the potentially misleading
and confusing effect that the information will have on the factfinding process.‖121 As Wilkinson-Ryan has pointed out, careful
adherence to the rules of evidence would reduce the amount of
psychiatric evidence that is admitted as evidence. 122 Advocates for
PWMI should therefore consider filing motions in limine on these
bases to exclude the use of mental health evidence to impeach the
credibility of their clients or witnesses.
C. Recommendation 3: Civil Courts Should Provide
Reasonable Accommodations to Improve the
Accessibility for PWMI.
Often, the reason that the testimony of PWMI is not heard is
because courts fail to provide the accommodations necessary for
their testimony to be taken. Giving testimony in a deposition or at
trial can be a highly stressful experience for anyone. 123 For people
117

Id.
Id. at 1376.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See id.
123
Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in
Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 108 (2000) (―Being a party in litigation is an
extremely stressful event. It ranks near the death of a loved one, the loss of a
job, and the experience of a grave illness.‖).
118
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who have severe anxiety, major depression, agoraphobia (fear of
leaving one‘s home), or certain other mental illnesses, the very
prospect of testifying may be overwhelming. 124 For others who
have difficulties in processing thoughts in a linear fashion or who
may have limited or atypical verbal expression, the inflexible
forms in which testimony is supposed to be elicited and conveyed
may be difficult to master.125 There are several accommodations
that can be made to facilitate the full participation of PWMI in
their own cases.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was intended to
usher in ―a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom‖
for people with physical and mental disabilities. 126 Title II of the
ADA requires public entities, such as courts, to be accessible to
these individuals. 127 The Supreme Court has held that ―this duty to
accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due
process principle that, ‗within the limits of practicability, a State
124

Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Appellate Decision-Making in the Context
of Disabled Litigants, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 313, 325 (2000) (―Litigation
involving persons with disabilities takes place in many different contexts: civil,
criminal, matrimonial, and administrative, to name just a few. However, all legal
contexts share the potential to demoralize, alienate, and entrench symptoms of
suspicion, bewilderment, and disenfranchisement for those with disabilities.‖).
125
Winick, supra note 123, at 110 (―Surely one of the most stressful
emotional aspects of a lawsuit is when the client testifies at trial or has his or her
deposition taken by the adverse party. The courtroom is a public place, and
testimony is taken from the witness stand in the presence of a variety of
strangers and enemies. Public speaking even in a friendly and supportive
environment can produce great stress for those who are inexperienced in doing
it. Playing such a key speaking role on center stage in the courtroom can thus be
a nightmare for many clients. Even depositions, which typically are taken in a
lawyer‘s office, will nonetheless be taken in front of strangers such as the court
reporter and also the adversarial parties in the lawsuit and their attorneys.‖).
126
President George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Ams. with
Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/
35th/videos/ada_signing_text.html.
127
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (―Recognizing that
failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same
practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take
reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to
accessibility.‖).
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must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be
heard‘ in its courts.‖ In reaching this decision, the Court
emphasized the ―fundamental right of access to the courts.‖128
Almost all of the focus of courthouse compliance with the
ADA has been with respect to physical access. ―[T]he question of
what aids and services are helpful for people with mental
disabilities is largely unexplored and must also be the subject of
discussion among judges, lawyers, mental health professionals,
people with disabilities, and court personnel.‖129
Recognizing that the prospect of submitting to a deposition or a
standard examination on the witness stand can be so stressful as to
be outside of the realm of possibility for litigants with certain
mental illnesses, in many cases MFY attorneys have successfully
sought various accommodations to prevent this type of problem
from shutting litigants out of their proceedings. For example,
judges can allow for interrogatories in lieu of depositions or limit
the length of depositions.130 Judges can also grant leeway in terms
of evidentiary rules, such as the prohibition against leading
questions on direct examination, where attorneys indicate that
strict adherence to form is likely to prevent them from being able
to elicit information from their clients or witnesses. Attorneys
should also ask judges to be cognizant of the special needs of their
clients during cross-examination and to be especially watchful that
they are not harassed by opposing counsel.

128

Id. at 533–34.
Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 770. The exception is
mental health courts, which, ―[i]n following the legal theory of therapeutic
jurisprudence . . . are attempting to improve justice by considering the
therapeutic and antitherapeutic consequences that ‗flow from substantive rules,
legal procedures, or the behavior of legal actors (lawyers and judges).‘‖ Wolff,
supra note 106, at 431.
130
See, e.g., Goldman v. Eggers, No. L&T 64884/2001 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct.
19, 2001) (ordering that ―discovery in this case [shall] proceed with the
production of documents and then with interrogatories rather than an oral
deposition‖ based on evidence of respondent‘s medical condition) (unpublished
decision) (copy on file at MFY).
129
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Other accommodations that would help make courts more
accessible for PWMI include:
1. Setting up a quiet waiting room for litigants for whom
the sometimes chaotic and noisy environment of the
courthouses may exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness
and the stressors contributing to decompensation. 131
2. Allowing for the flexible scheduling of hearings for
litigants who, for example, take medication that has the
side effect of making it difficult to wake up or be coherent
in the morning. 132
3. Allowing, upon request, priority for litigants or
witnesses with disabilities for whom a long wait in court
might exacerbate agitation and confusion. 133
4. Allowing, upon request, for telephone or video
appearances and testimony, or in-home hearings for
litigants or witnesses with disabilities such as agoraphobia,
claustrophobia, or age-related infirmities. 134
CONCLUSION
Despite clinical information and some jurisprudence to the
contrary, the apparent perception among many court and legal
personnel is that PWMI are generally incompetent and deceptive
witnesses. Because of these widespread misperceptions, the
disparity between myth and truth remains an imposing obstacle
when it comes to obtaining justice and equal opportunities for
PWMI in civil court. Courts and advocates should be doing all that
is in their power to ensure that PWMI do not fall through the
cracks when it comes to obtaining justice. With reasonable
accommodations, PWMI can have meaningful opportunities to
participate in litigation that concerns their lives.
Whenever possible, PWMI should have the opportunity to
testify in hearings where decisions will be made affecting their
131
132
133
134

See Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 770.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 771.
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lives. First, these individuals are generally the ones best qualified
to speak about their own experiences. Second, regardless of
whether individuals are able to recall their experiences well or
always communicate effectively, it is essential that judges and
juries be confronted with the humanity of those about whom they
will be making decisions and learn to be patient in listening to the
evidence they present. Third, the opportunity to participate in a
hearing, if handled properly, can be a highly empowering
experience for litigants who have grown accustomed to being
ignored or having to rely on others to speak for them. 135
The New York State Court of Appeals has warned of the
danger of structuring proceedings in such a way that people with
mental disabilities were not given voice. In the Matter of Joan
Brown v. Ristich involved an accusation by a developmentally
disabled resident of the infamous Willowbrook State School that a
staff member had attacked her with a broom, lacerating her
head. 136 The only eyewitnesses in the case were two other
residents, both of whom were also developmentally disabled. In
reinstating the administrative decision against Willowbrook, which
had been based in part on these residents‘ testimony, the court
noted the growing concerns about treatment of residents in such
institutions and set forth the important policies bolstering its
decision:
The right of petitioner [the Director of Willowbrook] is
undeniable. However, we cannot overlook the rights of
institutional residents, especially those incapable of
eloquent expression and abstract thought. These people also
deserve a fair hearing. To deny them the right to complain
of their treatment because they lack the ability to
conceptualize the nature of an oath would be blinding
ourselves to reality. 137
135

Winick, supra note 123, at 106 (―People like the opportunity to
participate in a process that affects them; they dislike being excluded from
participating. This participatory or dignitary value of process produces litigant
satisfaction and a greater degree of acceptance of and compliance with the
ultimate decision reached.‖).
136
Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183, 190 (1975).
137
Id. at 191–92.
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These words still ring true for people with all types of mental
disabilities, whether they are institutionalized or living in the
community. The very fact that their testimony is too often never
heard or taken seriously makes PWMI greater targets of abuse and
exploitation. It is our hope that this article will promote greater
awareness of these occurrences so that they occur with less
frequency and PWMI are given an equal playing field to defend
themselves and to seek redress when they have been wronged.

